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This article presents empirical evidence of the governance challenges faced by 
Australian not-for-profit (NFP) organisations. There is a dearth of academic research 
in the not-for-profit sector on issues of governance. Using survey and interview data, 
we explore what NFP leaders believe are key governance challenges, and what this 
means for theory and practice of NFP governance. We demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of governance systems is influenced by internal and external 
contingencies that NFP organisations face, such as variations in board roles, 
stakeholder and membership demands, funding arrangements, board member 
recruitment processes, skills of board members, and resources for training and 
development. We argue for a shift of focus away from prescriptive and normative 
NFP governance models, and contend that generic best practice governance standards 
for NFPs ought not to be further pursued, and that a contingency approach is more 
promising. 
 








There are numerous definitions of not-for-profit (NFP) organisations and the 
NFP sector. In this article we follow Hansmann, who describes an NFP organisation 
as  an organisation that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to 
individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or 
trustees (Hansmann, 1980). The Australian NFP sector comprises more than 600,000 
non-commercial and non-governmental organisations with purposes ranging from 
hospitals to community services, universities, sports clubs, aged care facilities and 
environmental groups. They also differ in size, with nearly three-quarters being small 
organisations that depend on the voluntary efforts of members (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2010). In 2012-2013, the sector employed 1,081,900 staff 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014a) or 8.75 per cent of total Australian 
employment (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014b). The Australian NFP sector has a 
turnover of approximately $100 billion per annum and has 5.2 million volunteers (Pro 
Bono Australia, 2014). Half of this turnover comes from services, membership fees 
and investments, one-third from federal, state or local government grants and the 
remainder is generated through fundraising, donations and sponsorship (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014a). Despite its size and complexity, there is a dearth of 
academic research in the not-for-profit sector on issues of governance.  
Ostrower and Stone (2006) observed that governance is rarely unambiguously 
defined in literature concerning NFP organisations and that research has focused on 
boards of directors. Indeed, most studies of NFP governance have concentrated on 
boards and their composition, the roles and responsibilities of their members and the 
relation between board effectiveness and organisational effectiveness (for example: 
Herman & Renz, 2000; Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003). BoardSource (2010) 
defines NFP governance as the board’s legal authority to exercise power and authority 
over an organisation on behalf of the community it serves. The board is authorized to 
establish policies, make decisions that affect the working of the organisation, and is 
accountable for the actions that follow those policies and decisions. We contend that 
this definition fails to capture the intricacies of the sector, which manifest in the 
different purposes, services, beneficiaries, funders and other internal and external 
factors influencing NFP organisations. Indeed, these varying characteristics may well 
be why NFP governance is difficult to define. This research has as its objective to 
shed additional light on the different characteristics of NFP organisations and their 
environment, and the manner in which these properties influence governance systems. 
We ask the following research questions: what are the governance challenges faced by 
NFP organisations, and what are the theoretical and practical implications of these 
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challenges? We conducted an online survey and interviews with NFP officers in order 
to uncover these governance challenges, the findings of which we discuss in the 
context of NFP governance literature. We argue for a shift of focus away from 
prescriptive and normative NFP governance models and best-practice standards and 
towards a contingency approach. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
BoardSource describes the roles of NFP boards as follows: (1) setting 
organisational direction and strategy, (2) monitoring or providing oversight of the 
CEO, assets and programs of the organisation and (3) ensuring necessary human and 
financial resources (BoardSource, 2010). Accompanying these specific roles are 
several theoretical perspectives. For example, in relation to the first role, a 
stewardship theory perspective would be most relevant as stewardship theory 
highlights the role of the board in increasing organisational performance by 
contributing to the organisation’s strategy and top decision-making (Cornforth, 2001). 
The second role, which states that it is the board’s role to monitor management, is 
closely aligned with agency theory, founded in finance and economics. This theory 
sees the board as the instrument to ensure that management acts in the best interests of 
shareholders or members, as it assumes that management is likely to act in their own 
interests rather than to the benefit of investors or beneficiaries (Miller, 2002). Thirdly, 
the board’s role to provide human and financial resources aligns with resource-
dependency theory. Resource dependency theory argues that organisations depend on 
other organisations and actors for resources and survival (Cornforth, 2001, citing 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Resource-dependency theory sees the board as a means of 
finding or providing these resources. 
Cornforth and Brown (2013) identify the board of directors as the body with the 
main responsibility for governance, but emphasise that other stakeholders also play an 
important role. For Cornforth, key actors such as managers, members and advisory 
groups also contribute to the governance of a NFP organisation. The need to involve 
the stakeholders of NFP organisations in governance processes has been increasingly 
recognised in scholarly research (Freiwirth, 2013). In these cases, stakeholder theory 
is most relevant to governance, as it states that the board’s role is to mediate among 
stakeholders and balance their interests (Freeman & Evan, 1991). Governance theories 
that emphasise the membership and stakeholders of NFP organisations are described 
as democratic models and stakeholder models. The democratic model states that the 
central role of the board of directors is to act on behalf of the membership, balance the 
interests of different member groups, and set the policy of the organisation. A crucial 
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element of this model is the notion of a board to which anybody can be elected, 
regardless of expertise (Cornforth, 2001). Stakeholder theory posits that by including 
diverse stakeholders on boards, organisations are more likely to address broad societal 
interests rather than the interests of a single group (Hung, 1998). 
Young (2011) has argued in favour of membership models of governance where 
board members are elected from the membership. Young also explores how the 
composition of the governing board and its method of selecting its members may 
influence the ability of the organization to tap into the different sources of funds. 
Further, Young argues that there is natural independence on the part of NFP directors 
due to their volunteer status, while recognising that this status provides little financial 
incentive to exert effort. Indeed, because of this volunteer status, the process of 
recruiting new directors is completely different in a NFP compared to a commercial 
organisation (Hendricks & Wyngaard, 2010). The difference between NFPs and their 
commercial counterparts means that governance standards designed for commercial 
entities cannot simply be imported into the NFP sector. NFPs are often challenged 
when it comes to ensuring the board has the right skills to fulfil its responsibilities 
(Spear, Cornforth, & Aiken, 2009). 
Perhaps the most common NFP governance challenge identified in the literature 
is the need to balance different stakeholders’ interests.  Unlike a commercial entity 
whose aim is to create profits for shareholders (arguably whilst also taking other 
stakeholder interests into account in order to ensure long-term sustainability), a NFP 
organisation may have several competing aims. A board will have to choose among 
the needs and desires of different groups of beneficiaries, funders and managers. For 
example, donors to charities can impose limitations on ways in which money can be 
spent by designating specific themes, which may not be in the interests of all 
beneficiaries. This forces NFP organisations to ‘go where the money is’, thereby 
creating a situation where donor dependency can undermine the organisation’s 
mission (Alymkulova & Seipulnik, 2005). This can result in asymmetric 
accountability, a potential pitfall for NFP organisations described by Jordan and Van 
Tuijl (2000) and Schepers (2006). When the goals of funders are not identical to those 
of the recipient organisation, upward accountability towards donors can become 
misaligned with downward accountability towards recipients of services.  
Considering the variety of NFPs and their stakeholders, Cornforth (2001) 
identifies key paradoxes in NFP governance: (1) the dynamic among board members 
as representatives for specific stakeholders and as experts required to drive the 
organisational performance, (2) the dynamic between the role of the board role in 
driving organisational performance and safeguarding conformance – in other words, 
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ensuring that the organisation acts in a responsible and prudent way, (3) the dynamic 
between the role of the board to control and support management, and (4) conflicting 
situations that arise as a result of accountability to different stakeholder groups. These 
tensions have implications for regulation as well as for theoretical perspectives. It has 
often been suggested that the use of a single theory describing NFP governance might 
be inadequate, as it is an untenable view that best practices exist for a wide range of 
non-profit governance situations (Salipante, 2013). The intricacy of the sector and the 
distinct governance challenges that NFP organisations can encounter also explain why 
corporate governance codes can be inappropriate for NFP governance (Spear et al., 
2009) and why there is no agreement on an ideal NFP governance model (Miller-
Millesen, 2003; Ostrower & Stone, 2006).  
Cornforth and Brown discuss the forces driving innovative approaches to 
governance, asserting that the growing significance of the sector and its increasing 
reliance on public funds have resulted in increased concerns about accountability and 
performance of NFP organisations (Cornforth & Brown, 2013). This development has 
manifested in the guise of formal inquiries and political debate. Basic questions are 
whether current governance arrangements are adequate, for example to safeguard the 
independence of NFP organisations in light of growing reliance on government funds, 
and whether NFP organisations are sufficiently accountable for their actions. Amidst 
the focus on innovation of NFP governance, Bradshaw cautions that a move away 
from “one best way” or normative approach to NFP governance can turn into 
“anything goes” (Bradshaw, 2009). 
Contingency theory has received growing recognition in organisational literature. 
The usefulness of adopting a contingency approach in relation to governance is the 
acknowledgement that governance processes are likely to work differently according 
to changes in the nature of an organisation and its circumstances, and consequently 
effectiveness is connected to the ongoing refinement of governance systems in line 
with these contingencies (Bradshaw, 2009). Bradshaw suggests emphasising the 
contingencies that are at work in the NFP sector, commenting that what is missing 
from the literature is a change management process that boards can use to help them 
reflect on their choices regarding governance configurations in a coherent fashion 
which provides direction on the contingency factors that the boards might take into 
account. Board members are usually told that board self-assessment is a core 
responsibility and that they should reflect on their governance practices in an annual 
board retreat. However, they have not been given much guidance on what factors to 
take into account when engaging in this type of process (Bradshaw, 2009). 
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Some academics have taken a contingency approach in NFP governance 
research. They argue that it is necessary to take into account the contextual factors that 
shape NFP board characteristics and influence the ways in which they operate 
(Cornforth, 2003); (Brown & Guo, 2010; Iecovich, 2005). (Ostrower & Stone, 2001) 
created a framework modelling the internal and external contingencies that influence 
board characteristics. They include as external contingencies power in society, 
turbulence and the legal and institutional environment – labelled as ‘broad’ 
dimensions because they are the same for all NFPs.  External contingencies such as 
stakeholders, industry and funding sources are labelled as ‘specific’ dimensions 
because they will be unique to each NFP. Internal contingencies are age, size, phase of 
development, and complexity of the organisation.  
Cornforth has since adapted and used this model to map contextual influences on 
boards found in other studies. It features social pressures, government legislation and 
policy, regulation, and the sector of the NFP as broad external contingencies, while 
the field of activity of the NFP is labelled as a specific external contingency. 
Cornforth identifies the size of the organisation and relationships with management as 
internal contingencies. It is argued that all contingencies influence the characteristics 
of the board, specifically its composition, relationships, and processes, all of which 
affect board roles and effectiveness (Cornforth, 2003). Others scholars such as 
Iecovich (2005) and Brown and Guo (2010) also found links between functional 
characteristics of NFP boards and the environmental conditions of the organisation. 
Freiwirth’s Community-Engagement Governance™ model advances the contingency 
approach by moving beyond the board of directors towards a framework where the 
community purpose or missions of the NFP is at the very centre of the governance 
system, while stakeholders such as staff, the membership and the community share 
responsibility for governance (Freiwirth, 2013).  
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
We answer the call for additional empirical research into governance challenges 
and contingencies in the NFP sector (Spear et al., 2009). Based on survey and 
interview data, we ask the following research questions: what are the governance 
challenges faced by NFP organisations? What are the theoretical and practical 
implications of these challenges? The findings will demonstrate that NFP 
organisations are influenced by internal and external contingencies that affect 
governance systems and processes. We put forward theoretical and practical 
suggestions arguing in favour of governance models that take a contingency instead of 
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a normative approach, demonstrating the value of taking context into account in 
establishing fitting governance arrangements. 
Data gathering consisted of an online survey and semi-structured interviews, 
authorised by the University’s Human Research Ethics Committee. The survey and 
interview questions were based on the characteristics of NFP organisations and the 
resulting governance paradoxes, as discussed in the introduction and literature review, 
which concern the purposes, services, beneficiaries, funders and other contextual 
elements that influence NFP organisations. The survey was conducted by research 
partner CompliSpace, a provider of governance, risk and compliance services, which 
circulated a survey through its network of NFP professionals. For the purpose of this 
research, we included a select number of survey questions which will be addressed 
further below. Using survey data is a proven method to perform research into 
governance in the NFP sector (O’Regan & Oster, 2005). Fifty-three representatives of 
NFP organisations completed the survey, each in a different professional roles but all 
involved in governance.  
Case studies and in-depth methods to research non-profits and their boards are 
common (Bradshaw, Hayday, Armstrong, Levesque, & Rykert, 1998). The survey 
data was therefore complemented with twelve interviews with executives and/or board 
members from an NFP organisation. The interviewees either contacted the researchers 
after hearing about the study or were referred by other NFP representatives. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted over the phone or in person, during which a 
template of questions (see appendix) was used with the possibility to delve into 
specific topics. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and sent to the interviewee 
to reflect on the content to ensure accuracy. After receiving feedback from 
interviewees, the transcribed interviews became a source of qualitative data which was 
coded in NVivo.  
The number of survey and interview respondents is not large compared to the 
number of NFP organisations in Australia. It will therefore be difficult to extrapolate 
the findings to the broader sector and conclusions must be made with caution. The 
data does however provide evidence of the variety of NFP organisations in Australia, 
the diversity of the sector, as well as the accompanying differences in circumstances 





Contemporary Management Research  10 
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE 
The International Classification of Non-Profit Organisations (ICNPO) was used 
to categorise the online survey respondents. Figure 1 shows the response to the survey 
question “Select the sector which best describes the primary area within which your 
organisation operates.” It can be seen that most sectors are represented in the survey, 
but with higher proportions in the categories Education and Research and Social 
Services. 
 
Figure 1  Breakdown of Survey Sample by Sector. 
 
The twelve interviewees represented the following sectors: Social Services (n=4); 
Development and Housing (n=3); Law, Advocacy and Politics (n=2); Education and 
Research (n=2); and Business and Professional Organisation, Unions (n=1). Two 
industry sectors that were not represented among the survey and interview 
respondents were Culture and Arts and Religion.   
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES FOR NFPS 
 
Board Roles 
Both the interview and survey data confirmed the role of all boards in setting 
strategy, also revealing that some boards struggle with this role. Other board 
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“Really their main job is a combination of thinking strategically on behalf of the 
organisation and monitoring performance […]” [INT1] 
“It is monitoring decision making. I would like to be more strategic […]” [INT5] 
“Strategy and attracting sponsors.” [INT6]   
“The role of the board is to set the strategic directions for the organisation. It’s 
quite clear.” [INT8]  
“The board plays a role in accountability, so the checks and balances around the 
finances. They provide a role in development of strategy [...]” [INT12] 
“It’s monitoring and advice, not strategic.” [INT11] 
The answers to the survey question “How important to the organisation is the 
board’s role in performing the following functions?” confirmed the multi-faceted role 
of the board, with no single role standing out as more important than to others (Figure 
2). On a scale of 1 (not important) to 7 (very important), all board roles averaged 
between 3.8 and 4.2. However, the standard deviation for the importance of board 
roles fell between 1.6 and 2.7, indicating considerable variation in the importance of 
particular roles for individual boards. 
The differing importance of particular board roles for each NFP shows why a 
contingency approach to governance is desirable. For example, the following 
interview quote demonstrates that board members can have little experience in 
organisational planning or strategy while the fulfilment of this task is deemed 
important. To remedy this situation, board members with these skills will either need 
to be recruited or existing directors will need to be trained. 
“What I find is, as a board member […] I have to end up doing a lot of stuff, so I 
write the asset management plan and I have also written the strategic plan, 
because the CEO could do it, but we are not able to kind of pay the big bucks for 
a high-powered CEO so I could probably do it better, and there is just not a lot of 
time when you only have three staff and you have tenancies happening all over 
the place. Whereas say if I was on the board of [a large NFP], you wouldn’t do 
any of that, you would purely be focused on governance in the sense of reviewing 
the work that your staff has done and giving that direction, and that is a whole 
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Figure 2  Importance of The Board in Performing The following Functions  
(1) Not Important to (7) Very Important 
 
BOARD COMPOSITION, RECRUITMENT AND SKILL SETS 
Our research provides evidence that recruitment of suitable directors is a 
significant challenge for NFP organisations, particularly those with membership-based 
governance models. The interview questions “how do you recruit board members” and 
“who qualifies for board membership” proved to be closely related because the 
constitution of NFP organisations often prescribes a specific pool of individuals from 
which board members must be sourced.  
“Our board is elected from amongst the membership, with no capacity to co-opt 
or appoint other experts other than to fill a casual vacancy, so it is an election 
model. Because our members are organisations rather than individuals, it is the 
organisations that can nominate and vote, but it is actually independent 
individuals, either from those organisations or more generally from the industry 
that actually stand.” [INT1] 
Interviewees were asked about the skills required of board members. The 
majority indicated that the process through which people become directors, as dictated 
by the constitution or policies, can result in a limited pool of potential directors which 








0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
Supporting and advising management








Contemporary Management Research  13  
 
 
“[Our governance arrangements] are very inflexible, the constitution and the 
incorporation requirements are really premised on you being a community-based 
organisation that is run by members, where there will be a vibrant contest for 
positions that govern the organisation, and it doesn’t really work for the sort of 
work we do. We need people with skills and particular expertise, it is quite hard 
to do that. We have been very fortunate that we have good people that have great 
expertise, but that is in spite of the governance, not because of it.” [INT11]  
“There is a set of criteria in the constitution which talks about the skills they 
should have. So the constitution sets it up as a skills based board […] In actual 
practice, because we are only a small organisation, with a lot of them it is like 
“who will join”, and they are elected by the members who are mostly tenants. If 
you look at the skills list and you look who is actually on the board, a lot of the 
skills are missing and quite a lot of the board members probably don’t have any 
of those skills to any great degree.” [INT2] 
Ironically, there is evidence that governance arrangements in NFP organisations 
can impose constraints on the recruitment of suitable directors to enforce governance. 
This results in a situation where governance systems can have perverse and 
undermining effects. The incapacity of a number of NFP organisations to recruit 
directors based on skills, as well as the absence of financial incentives to join NFP 
boards, clearly sets NFP boards apart from their commercial counterparts. As a result, 
training and development of sitting board members is vital to NFP organisations. 
 
DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 
Research shows that risk management, legal compliance, strategy and business 
planning, financial management, and directors duties were the most desired 
governance training topics among Australian community organisations (Nicholson, 
Newton, McGregor-Lowndes, & Sheldrake, 2008). In our survey, 72 percent of 
respondents answered affirmatively to the question “Does your organisation provide 
continuing professional training for its non-executive board members?” Interview 
respondents were also asked about initiatives that enable director skill development: 
“No one has actually asked.  We do try to be very proactive on the board, so we 
have a number of sub-committees that we use to help people, they can 
participate in a sub-committee with more experienced board members that 
would then facilitate the understanding of development. And every couple of 
years the board has had someone external come in to talk about process, 
strategy and governance.” [INT7] 
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“[…] we do have board workshops that look at governance and other issues.” 
[INT4] 
Other respondents mentioned that although they were open to skills development 
of their directors, practicalities such as time, money and lack of interest on the part of 
board members had prevented any structured approach to skills development: 
“We have, kind of on paper, the ability to skill up directors, but in practice I 
don’t believe that it happens very much, we don’t spend a lot of time sending 
directors to courses or bringing in professional development people or any of 
those sorts of things. If a director came on and said ‘look I have been elected but 
I really don’t understand financial reporting, how can you help me’, we would 
definitely respond to that but it would be relatively informal or ad hoc rather 
than formal.” [INT1] 
“I think they do the best that they can […] but we’re running on no money, the 
board all have full-time jobs as well have given their time, some of them, for 
many years. So to the best of their ability, I don’t think we are going to take days 
out to develop, or pay for, board members to go to courses.” [INT12] 
As can be seen in the findings, although 72 percent of the survey respondents 
claim that training and development is provided for directors, the interview evidence 
suggests this training may not always be comprehensive. The reasons for this relate to 
a lack of funding as well as timing, factors that are likely to disproportionally affect 
small and modestly sized NFP organisations. Variance in the number of resources 
available for development can affect the functioning of the board and represents a 
contingency that can influence each NFP organisation differently.  
 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS 
Public scrutiny following use of government funds and growth in delivery of 
public services by NFPs has driven innovation of governance in the sector (Cornforth 
& Brown, 2013). The table shows the response to the survey question “From which 
source does your organisation receive the majority of its funding?” and displays 
dependence on government funds by NFPs in the sample. We argue that funding 
sources represent contingencies that, for accountability reasons, need to be considered 
in any governance model.  
 
 




Figure 3  Sources of majority of funding. 
 
The importance of service delivery in the decision to financially support a NFP 
organisation was evident in the survey sample. When survey respondents were asked 
to “Rank, in order of priority, the factors that influence your donors/financial 
supporters to back your organisations to rank the factors influencing donors to back 
the organisation”, the activities of the organisation were by far considered the most 
important. The importance of these activities in obtaining funding also became 
apparent from the interviews: 
“But it’s our activities and our output that get people to support us and want to 
stay engaged with us.” [INT2] 
“I think people like our work and they are prepared to join. They want to support 
the organisation.” [INT11] 
“So beyond our members we also have customers and clients of this organisation 
who buy our services or attend our training and those sorts of things.” [INT1] 
The survey respondents were asked to “Rate each stakeholder group in order of 
importance.” As shown in figure, the recipients of services, clients and/or 
beneficiaries are considered the most important stakeholders of NFP organisations. 
Yet, the fact that the majority of NFPs rely on government funding creates a 
problematic dynamic: as governments are often the main funder, but are unlikely to be 
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form potential pitfalls. These issues are likely to present a problem for all NFP 
organisations part of this research, albeit to different degrees depending on sources 
and quantity of funding. In reporting on activities and justifying spending, 
organisations are accountable to funders as well as to recipients of services, clients 
and/or beneficiaries. These groups will display varying degrees of overlap for each 
NFP organisation, which leads to different accountability mechanisms, suggesting that 
variations in funding circumstances represent contingencies that can affect 
governance. 
 
1    (1.7) Recipients of services/clients/beneficiaries  
2    (3.0) Employees 
3    (4.9) Government 
4    (5.3) Executives 
=    (5.3) Directors 
5    (5.5) Financial Supporters 
6    (5.9) Volunteers 
7    (6.6) Regulators 
8    (7.7) Suppliers/contractors 
9    (9.4) Other 
Figure 4  Stakeholder Groups in Order of Importance  
(1) Most Important to (10) Least Important 
 
 
The question of NFP accountability is closely related to the balancing of 
stakeholder interests. In the literature, balancing of stakeholder interests is identified 
as one of the key challenges for NFP boards (Young, 2011; Dawson & Dunn, 2006; 
Spear et al., 2009). Our interview findings confirm that NFP boards often have to 
balance the needs of multiple important stakeholders. The members and funders of the 
organisation are generally classified as being of the highest importance. 
“[…] two main ones are our core members and our government funding body 
here in NSW” [INT1] 
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“[Tenants and] obviously the Department of Housing because they funded all the 
properties. They would probably be the two main ones.” [INT2] 
“So to me the two critical stakeholders are our funders and our members.” 
[INT7] 
“We have staff, our board of directors, government, both federal and state 
government, all our contractors that provide maintenance services to our 
properties, the communities we operate in, we have a number of support 
agencies who work in partnership with us.” [INT8] 
The interviews indicate that the diversity of stakeholder groups and their 
differing expectations do indeed pose challenges for NFP organisations. When asked 
to identify the main challenges are that different stakeholder groups present, interview 
participants responded: 
“Primarily the diversity of it. It is a constant challenge for this organisation to 
identify what business we are in and what our members and stakeholders expect 
of us, and how to respond to that […] Our job is to identify that our stakeholders 
are diverse in their expectations and can change almost on a daily basis, but 
certainly on a weekly basis; to make prioritising decisions and strategic 
decisions about what we actually do and how we respond to our members and 
stakeholders’ expectations; what work we can do; and how much they have to 
pay for it.” [INT1] 
“Expectations, the balance between a national focus and a state focus, and the 
challenge of local priorities taking precedence over national initiatives.” [INT6] 
In order to balance stakeholder interests, Young (2011) suggests the 
establishment of membership-based boards with equal stakeholder and donor 
representation, while Freiwirth argues in favour of Community-Engagement 
Governance™, in which responsibility for governance is shared across the 
organisation rather placed entirely on the board (Freiwirth, 2013). Our findings 
concerning board composition, recruitment, skill sets, and development demonstrate 
that membership-based boards and stakeholder-based boards, despite having the 
advantages advocated by Young and Freitwith, also have disadvantages, particularly 
in relation to the skill sets of board members, as recruitment and director development 
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DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
We set out to answer the following research questions: what are the governance 
challenges faced by NFP organisations, and what are the theoretical and practical 
implications of these challenges? Using theory, survey data and interview quotes, we 
have demonstrated that NFPs face distinct internal and external contingencies that 
determine the most effective governance systems (Figure 5). The data reveals several 
contingencies that have consequences for governance processes. For instance it was 
found that, on average, no particular NFP board role stands out from the others. 
Rather, the empirical data indicates considerable variation in the importance of 
particular roles for individual boards, whether this concerns strategic direction, 
monitoring or obtaining funding. This in turn has consequences for theoretical 
perspectives that are applied to NFP governance, as the usefulness of stewardship 
theory, agency theory, resource-dependence theory and stakeholder theory varies 
according to the different directives of NFP boards. This provides empirical evidence 
in favour of taking a contingency approach towards theories concerning NFP board 
roles. 
Our study also provides evidence that recruitment of suitable directors is a 
significant challenge for NFP organisations, particularly concerning those NFPs with 
membership-based board models, as the constitution often determines the specific 
pool of individuals from which board members must be sourced. This can result in a 
situation where NFP organisations are unable to recruit directors based on skills and 
increases the importance of training and development of existing board members. 
While nearly three-quarters of the survey respondents stated that the organisation 
facilitates professional training for directors, interview responses indicated that, in 
practice, lack of time and resources are obstacles for director development. 
Considering the demonstrated importance of skills development on NFP boards due to 
recruitment complications, we contend that any lack of resources for training and 
development of directors represents a specific contingency that can interfere with the 
functioning of the board as the main governance body. 
Our findings furthermore indicate that funding circumstances represent 
contingencies that can affect the governance model of a NFP organisation. The data 
suggests that funding dynamics can undermine accountability and governance. 
Specifically the fact that the government is the largest donor of NFPs in the sample, 
while the recipients of services are classified as the most important stakeholders. The 
balancing of stakeholder interests is closely related to this finding. Some scholars 
argue for donor and stakeholder representation on NFP governance bodies (Freiwirth, 
2013; Young, 2011), which may help mitigate the negative elements associated with 
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donor dependency and asymmetric accountability. However, our study finds that 
NFPs that currently have a membership-based board are often unable to recruit 
directors with appropriate skills, while it also finds it can be difficult for NFPs to 
facilitate the development of the skills of their directors due to the lack of available 
resources, resulting in a conflicting dynamic between the demand for skills and 
stakeholder representation on governance bodies. 
 
Figure 5  Contingency Framework (Empirical Findings in Italic). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through our research, we provide evidence that generic best practice governance 
standards for NFPs ought not to be pursued. Our research finds that broad governance 
standards are likely to be too non-specific to provide substantial guidance. Instead the 
advancement of governance research will depend on working inductively from 
research findings towards theory and vice versa. In practice there are great benefits in 
considering contextual elements of governance. NFP organisations should be able to 
choose how to model their governance frameworks according to different 
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While this research identifies contingencies that form governance challenges for 
NFP organisations, further research could systematically address these hurdles and 
develop appropriate processes though which to adapt governance models. In other 
words, best practice governance in the NFP sector should not take the shape of 
broadly defined standards, formulated by organisations or regulatory bodies, but 
should instead be given form in an analytical tool that assists in identifying the 
contextual factors influencing the organisation, and contributes to the adoption of 
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1. Which sector is your organisation in? (i.e. education, health, environment, etc.)  
2. Can you describe the purpose or mission or your organisation?  
3. How many employees and volunteers work for the organisation?  
 
Stakeholders 
4. Who are your organisation’s most important stakeholders? (i.e. beneficiaries, 
financial supporters, government.)  
5. What are the factors that influence your supporters to back your organisation? 
(i.e. activities, location, ethos, transparency). 
6. Can you elaborate on the ways in which you engage with stakeholders? 
7. How often do you engage with these stakeholders?  
8. What are the main challenges that these stakeholders pose? 
 
Board Structure 
9. How many board members does the organisation have, and is this optimal?  
10. How many of these board members are employees and how many are 
volunteers?  
11. Does the board have sub-committees? If so, which areas do these cover and are 
they useful?  
12. Who qualifies for board membership (criteria for selection).  How do you 
recruit these board members?  
 
Board Role 
13. How would you describe the primary role of your organisation’s board? (i.e. 
decision-making, monitoring, finding funding, or giving advice.)  
14. Does your organisation regularly evaluate board performance and how does the 
organisation develop directors as effective board members?  
15. What skills and experience does the board need from its directors?  
16. Is there anything else you wish to add?  
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